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64 abstract
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, when countries are facing difficulties in 
raising the amounts of revenue needed to cover the expenditure side of the budget, 
fiscal risks can pose a significant threat to the sustainability of public finance. This 
became particularly evident in the case of public enterprises and their liabilities, 
which often increased public debt because of difficulties in meeting their financial 
obligations. The aim of this paper is to evaluate fiscal risks from government 
guarantees in Croatia and the European Union in general. Moreover, the paper 
aims to analyse the dynamics of the value and structure of government guarantees 
in Croatia in the period from 2009 to first half of 2015. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the impact of government guarantees on direct public debt in the con-
text of methodological changes in the registration of public debt. 
Keywords: fiscal risks, contingent liabilities, government guarantees, public debt, 
Croatia
1 IntRoDUctIon
Sound government finance has always been a prerequisite for competitiveness, 
economic development and the well-being of the population. The global financial 
crisis has made this imperative even more important. Public financial manage-
ment has as almost never before been under the continuous surveillance of rating 
agencies, creditors, and other relevant institutions. This applies to all levels of 
government and often becomes an issue of supranational supervision as in the 
European Union (EU). In order to facilitate and maintain the stability of the Un-
ion, member states have signed the stability and growth pact, which implies fiscal 
monitoring of member states and ensures their compliance with the Maastricht 
criteria. This is particularly important for new EU members with weaker capaci-
ties for public financial management. In addition, those economies are mostly still 
undergoing the transition process, which makes their public finances even more 
vulnerable to the unrestrained rise in government liabilities. Besides explicit lia-
bilities, those countries often face a sizable fiscal risk emerging from contingent 
government liabilities and other sources of risk.
This paper aims to analyse the importance of government guarantees in the EU, 
with particular reference to the Republic of Croatia. State guarantees – an impor-
tant type of budgetary contingencies – tend to be partly ignored in the context of 
fiscal analysis. With such an approach, the assessment of the financial health of 
the state can result in an inaccurate impression of the real fiscal position of a coun-
try. This paper strives to highlight the importance of the appropriate treatment of 
government guarantees. Comparing the data for various EU countries, the paper 
will examine whether the stock of government guarantees in EU countries ex-
ceeds the level of their explicit direct liabilities. Moreover, the comparative analy-
sis will show whether government guarantees in Croatia are higher than the EU 
average. Finally, the main part of the paper will examine the structure of govern-
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65Primorac (2011) on the size and structure of government guarantees in Croatia. 
Bajo and Primorac (2011) in their analyses covered the period from 1996 to 2010, 
whereas this paper covers the remaining period until first half of 2015, capturing 
the effect of the accession to the EU. This is important not only due to changes that 
have occurred in the size and structure of guarantees, but also in the statistical 
treatment (changes in the methodology of national accounts) of government guar-
antees in Croatia (which has gradually aligned with the EU standards). 
The paper is divided into six chapters. After the introduction, we provide a theo-
retical background to the issue and management of guarantees and contextualize 
the topic in the light of the recent trends in public financial and risk management. 
The third chapter is devoted to government guarantees in the EU. The fourth chap-
ter analyses the size and structure of government guarantees in Croatia, and the 
fifth chapter aims at discussing the fiscal implications of government guarantees, 
capturing their impact on public debt. The last, sixth, part is the conclusion.
2 tHeoRetIcal bacKGRoUnD anD PolIcY conteXt
Fiscal risks can be broadly defined as the possibility of deviations of fiscal out-
comes from what was expected at the time of preparation of the budget or other 
forecasts (Cebotari et al., 2009). Fiscal risks come from many sources and in 
many forms, which makes it difficult for governments to identify and categorize 
them for the purposes of analysis and disclosure. However, most can be grouped 
into macroeconomic and specific risks (IMF, 2014). Macroeconomic risks include 
unforeseen developments in real GDP growth and inflation, commodity prices, 
exchange rates and interest rates, external assistance flows, and so on. Specific 
risks relate to budgetary contingencies, asset and liability management, govern-
ment guarantees, public private partnerships, financial sector exposure, as well as 
natural resource and environmental risks. 
In the second half of 2014 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented its 
new Fiscal Transparency Code (FTC) – an international standard for disclosure of 
information about public finances. The Code comprises a set of principles built 
around four pillars: (1) fiscal reporting; (2) fiscal forecasting and budgeting; (3) 
fiscal risk analysis and management; and (4) resource revenue management. The 
fiscal risks pillar (with its 12 principles) should ensure that risks to public finances 
are disclosed, analysed and managed, and fiscal decision-making across the public 
sector effectively coordinated. As a part of its initiative, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department developed a comprehensive framework for evaluating fiscal risk 
management practices and conducted pilot fiscal transparency evaluations in sev-
eral countries (e.g. Costa Rica, Ireland, Russia and Bolivia).
Fiscal risk management is relatively underdeveloped in Europe and not well re-
flected in EU fiscal requirements. In fact, fiscal risks in EU countries have been 
ignored until quite recently. At the beginning of 2015, Eurostat for the first time 
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66 member states (Eurostat, 2015). The data were collected as part of the Enhanced 
Economic Governance Package (the “six-pack”, Council Directive 2011/85/EU). 
In this classification, contingent liabilities include guarantees, liabilities related to 
public-private partnerships recorded off-balance sheet, and liabilities of compa-
nies that are controlled by the state, but classified outside the general government 
(public corporations). However, the detailed structure of those liabilities, as well 
as the probability of their occurrence remains unknown. 
Government guarantees are part of contingent but explicit government liabilities, by 
which the guarantor (the government) undertakes to a lender that if a borrower de-
faults, the guarantor will make good the loss the lender would otherwise suffer (Bajo 
and Primorac, 2015). In case the guarantees are called (e.g. due to the occurrence of 
an “insured” event) the government takes on full responsibility for liabilities cov-
ered by the guarantee. International public sector accounting standards define a con-
tingent liability as: (1) a possible obligation that arises from past events and whose 
existence will be confirmed only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or 
more uncertain future events not wholly within the control of the entity; or (2) a 
present obligation that arises from past events but is not recognized because: (a) it is 
not probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits or service 
potential will be required to settle the obligation; or (b) the amount of the obligation 
cannot be measured with sufficient reliability (International Federation of Account-
ants, 2013: International Public Sector Accounting Standard 19). The most frequent 
examples of government guarantees include those for liabilities incurred by lower 
levels of government and public enterprises, development banks and guarantee 
agencies, public-private partnership projects and other forms of cooperation be-
tween the government and the private sector (Bajo and Primorac, 2011).
Although government guarantees might be convenient in terms of reaching the de-
sired outcome (supporting beneficiaries) without incurring expenditure, this is at the 
same time the most dangerous disadvantage of guarantees. Potential obligations 
from government guarantees are not budgeted and accounted for, nor are they con-
sidered in conventional fiscal analysis (Polackova, 1999). They can be used as a 
means to bypass the government’s fiscal constraints on central and local government 
borrowing, which is why they can produce a hidden and adverse effect on fiscal 
policy (Bajo and Primorac, 2011). Guarantees can often have potentially significant 
fiscal consequences. This is clearly the case where countries have issued guarantees 
extensively, as happened in many countries in transition that sought to shift the costs 
of structural reforms to the future through guarantees (Ter-Minassian, 2005). 
Managing fiscal risk at the national level is particularly important in the European 
Union as a way of maintaining fiscal and general economic stability. However, very 
few member states have the institutional frameworks and capacities to effectively 
control and manage contingent liabilities (Polackova and Brixi, 2004). For instance, 
fiscal costs can be significant in federal countries where there is an assumption that 
the central government will bail out sub-national governments that get into financial 
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67pected to stand behind privatised firms and financial institutions once they get ex-
posed to competition (Ter-Minassian, 2005). In the EU context, new member states 
have been perhaps most prone to the accumulation of contingent liabilities and re-
lated fiscal risk (Polackova and Brixi, 2004). A further concern is that the fiscal costs 
of guarantees and other contingent liabilities are often exposed precisely during 
crises (Ter-Minassian, 2005). One way to reduce the risk of such surprises and im-
prove the measurement and budgeting of guarantees is to promote transparency 
about fiscal risks and their potential costs (Thobani, 1999; Ter-Minassian, 2005).
3 GoVeRnMent GUaRantees In tHe eU
According to the EU law, contingent liabilities are not included in the scope of the 
general government debt.1 The value and structure of government guarantees for 
most EU countries have been publicly available for some time. However, data on 
other contingent liabilities of EU member states were first made publicly available 
in January 2015. This was the outcome of a process that started in November 
2011, when the European Parliament and the Council adopted an Enhanced Eco-
nomic Governance package – the so-called “six pack”, which required collection 
and publication of relevant information on contingent liabilities of all general gov-
ernment sub-sectors with a potentially large impact on the state budget, including 
guarantees, non-performing loans and liabilities of public enterprises. The new 
questionnaire (“Supplement on contingent liabilities and potential obligations to 
the excessive deficit procedure related questionnaire”) was added to an existing 
group of questionnaires on the excessive deficit procedure. Thus, national statisti-
cal offices submit data from the new questionnaire annually (by December 31) for 
the previous year, including data on standardised and one-off guarantees, off-bal-
ance sheet public-private partnerships and non-performing loans (Eurostat, 2014).
Standardised guarantees are typically issued in large numbers, each usually backing 
a small loan (e.g. export credits and guarantees for student loans). They are issued for 
the benefit of financial institutions granting loans under specific lending programmes 
approved by national authorities. One-off guarantees are awarded on a case-by-case 
basis, usually for individual high-value contracts (e.g. big infrastructure projects, 
guarantees for loans of public enterprises). These guarantees are typically subject to 
close monitoring, because they could potentially provide unfair competitive advan-
tage to the particular firms whose loans are guaranteed. Therefore, the issuance of 
such guarantees is monitored by EU competition authorities or even the WTO. 
Data on guarantees in the EU do not include those issued under the Framework 
Agreement of the European Financial Stability Facility2, derivative-type guaran-
1 See Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit pro-
cedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community.
2 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is a company agreed to by the countries that share the euro 
in 2010 and incorporated in Luxembourg. The EFSF’s objective is to preserve financial stability of Europe’s 
monetary union by providing temporary financial assistance to euro area member states if needed. The assis-
tance is financed by the EFSF through the issuance of bonds and other debt instruments backed by guarantees 
given by the euro area member states in accordance with their share in the paid-up capital of the European 
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68 tees (e.g. credit default swaps)3, deposit insurance guarantees and comparable 
schemes and government guarantees issued for natural disasters (earthquakes, 
large scale flooding), the occurrence of which is very difficult to cover via com-
mercial insurance (Eurostat, 2015).
The global financial crisis has had a significant effect on the accumulation of 
government guarantees in EU countries. Since the consequences of the crisis 
were most severe in the financial sector, governments have often called for state 
intervention in order to safeguard the collapsing financial systems. Therefore, a 
significant amount of government guarantees arose in the past due to securities 
issued under liquidity schemes (e.g. in Greece and the United Kingdom). Some 
member states even created special purpose vehicles to tackle the emerging prob-
lems faced by the financial sector. In Denmark – a state guarantee was issued to 
cover losses in Roskilde Bank, in Ireland – a special purpose vehicle related to 
the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), in Spain – Sociedad de 
Gestión de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB), in 
France – Societé de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), and in Austria 
– guarantees were issued for the activities of Clearingbank (Eurostat, 2014b). 
However, countries have also issued guarantees to support other sectors and 
causes. For example, Finland has used government guarantees to promote its ex-
ports (particularly to United States and Germany), as well as for domestic opera-
tions of SMEs through Finnvera (a state-owned financing company that is the 
official export credit agency for Finland). Guarantees were also issued for the 
long-term loans of Finavia – a state-owned corporation responsible for maintain-
ing and developing its 25 airports and Finland’s air navigation system. In general, 
the structure and intensity of issuing guarantees in EU countries depend on 
national particularities including the strategic objectives, the structure of the 
economy (dominant economic sectors and those of strategic importance), state 
ownership and many other factors. 
In 2013, guarantees as a share of GDP were highest in Austria (35%), followed by 
Ireland, Finland, Spain, Germany and Slovenia, whereas the lowest shares were 
recorded in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Romania) but also in Greece 
(figure 1). The Croatian government had issued guarantees amounting to 7.25% of 
GDP, which is lower than the EU average of 10.5%. However, the average is a 
biased statistic given the wide dispersion of data: in terms of the median, which is 
a more accurate measure of the central tendency of data in this sample, Croatia 
was positioned just slightly below the median observation, which was 7.9%.
3 Derivative-type guarantees are those that are actively traded on financial markets and fall under the usual 
treatment of derivatives, which do not require specific provisions for government transactions in the EU mar-
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69Figure 1


















































































































































































































































It is quite surprising that the old EU members in general have higher relative 
amounts of guarantees than the new members. The old members tend to take a 
leading role in promoting transparency, accountability and implementing good 
practices in public financial management. Nonetheless, they seem to use off-bal-
ance sheet liabilities more frequently than the new members, which are still in 
different phases of transition and would therefore be expected to rely more heav-
ily on government guarantees. Whether the old EU members really have more 
experience in utilising the benefits of guarantees or some other factors have deter-
mined their particularly high exposure to guarantees remains an open question. 
One should however note that in several countries guarantees were issued within 
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70 affected by the crisis. Moreover, the coverage of guarantees is incomplete in most 
countries (Eurostat, 2015). In Croatia, for instance, data are not available for 
standardised guarantees and guarantees of the local government subsector.
In any case, the recent crisis indubitably plays an important role in explaining how 
the size of government guarantees changed over time. Government guarantees in 
Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and Italy increased from 2010 to 2013 by more than 5% 
of GDP mainly due to new issues of guarantees provided to financial institutions. 
On the other hand, guarantees in the United Kingdom, Austria, and especially 
Ireland decreased significantly, mostly due to setting aside the rescue measures 
related to state interventions in the financial system during the crisis. In the United 
Kingdom, the guarantees issued under the liquidity schemes ceased to exist in 
2013. Austrian Clearingbank, which served as an intermediary on the interbank 
market by borrowing funds (backed up by state guarantees) and lending to credit 
institutions and insurance undertakings, wound up in 2011. Irish NAMA was set 
up with the aim of addressing the problem of impaired assets in the banking sys-
tem. Assets (primarily land and development loans) were transferred from banks 
to NAMA to strengthen their balance sheets and ensure that uncertainty over bad 
assets is reduced. In addition, the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) scheme 
was introduced to provide the participating institutions (mainly systemically im-
portant and solvent credit institutions incorporated in Ireland) with access to me-
dium-term state-guaranteed funding (with maturities of up to five years). Since the 
ELG scheme was abolished and the NAMA’s task was to bring the balance sheet 
down to zero as soon as commercially practicable, government guarantees in Ire-
land decreased from 2010 to 2013 by almost 65% of GDP. 
Figure 3
Total general government debt (gross debt plus guarantees) of EU countries in 
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71To get a clear perspective on the significance of government guarantees in EU 
countries, it is also useful to compare the size of government guarantees with 
the size of public debt. The share of general government debt in GDP in 2013 
was lowest in Estonia (10%) and highest in Greece (175%) (figure 3). The debt/
GDP ratio in Croatia was 76%, which was above the EU average of 72%. With 
government guarantees included, the overall picture of relatively high public 
sector indebtedness does not change much: in addition to Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal, Italy Cyprus and Belgium, two more countries – Austria and Spain – 
would have a total government debt exceeding 100% of GDP, and three more 
– France, the United Kingdom and Germany – would be close to that bench-
mark. Only 10 out of 28 countries would satisfy the 60% benchmark Maastricht 
criterion, as against the 12 when government guarantees are not included in 
public debt.
4 sIze anD stRUctURe of GoVeRnMent GUaRantees In cRoatIa
The Croatian Government and Ministry of Finance have been issuing financial 
guarantees since 1995 and performance guarantees since 1998 (Bajo et al., 2011). 
With financial guarantees, the government warrants that an original debtor’s fi-
nancial liabilities will be settled if the debtor is unable to settle them fully and on 
time. Performance guarantees are issued against a pledge of movable property to 
guarantee the fulfilment of a contract to deliver/return goods or services. Figure 4 
shows the amounts of financial and performance guarantees issued in the period 
from 2009 to the first half of 2015. 
Figure 4 










2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
Financial guarantees Performance guarantees
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
The total amount of guarantees issued ranged from HRK 5.6bn in 2012 to HRK 
12.6bn in 2014. Financial guarantees are prevalent in the reported period, whereas a 
significant amount of performance guarantees appears only in the first half of 2015 
and relates to the shipbuilding sector, which – after a while – again seems to have 
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72 The Law on the Execution of Government Budget, which is passed for each year, 
stipulates the annual value of the new government guarantees (planned), as well 
as conditions of their issuance. Figure 5 shows a comparison of planned and is-
sued guarantees: the amount of financial guarantees actually issued exceeded the 
limit set forth by the budget law through the entire period. This is because guaran-
tees issued pursuant to the decisions of the Parliament, which account for a large 
share of the total, are not counted towards the annual limit in the budget law (Bajo 
and Petrušić, 2014). In 2012 and 2013, this gap was somewhat smaller because the 
Parliament was less active in issuing guarantees, so the limit set out by the budget 
law was largely adhered to. However, the trend reversed in 2014, when the amount 
of guarantees issued was more than double the maximum amount of guarantees 
prescribed in the budget law.
Figure 5










2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
Planned guarantees Issued guarantees
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
Figure 6
Domestic and foreign financial guarantees issued from 2009 to the first half of 
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73Several other breakdowns provide interesting information on the structure of gov-
ernment guarantees and how it has evolved over time. 
Among financial guarantees there has been a steady increase in the share of guar-
antees on loans provided by domestic financial institutions (figure 6). In 2013, the 
share of such guarantees reached 98% of the total. However, this increase did not 
reflect greater reliance of public enterprises on borrowings from domestic banks, 
but rather a sharp fall in foreign bank lending and, as a result, guarantees on such 
loans. This trend reversed in 2014, with HRK 4.5bn of guarantees issued for the 
loans that Croatian Highways took from foreign financial institutions. 
Most of the guarantees back bank loans denominated in euros (figure 7). Guaran-
tees for bank loans denominated in HRK increased steadily between 2009 and 
2014, but disappeared in the first half of 2015.
Figure 7 
Currency structure of financial guarantees issued from 2009 to the first half of 









2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
EUR HRK USD
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
Most of the government guarantees back loans provided by domestic commercial 
banks (figure 8). The share of financial guarantees backing up loans provided by 
foreign financial institutions decreased significantly between 2010 and 2013, but 
jumped in 2014 to the highest level ever. This reflected mainly the guarantee for 
the Deutsche Bank London loan to Croatian Highways to refinance existing loans. 
In 2009-11, some guarantees were also issued to back up the loans provided by 
EBRD, IBRD and EIB for infrastructure projects (highways, roads and ports); and 
in 2014 for a HRK 0.8bn loan provided by the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (CBRD) to Croatian Railways Passenger Transport for the pur-
chase of trains.
Turning to sectoral breakdown, between 2009 and 2013 financial guarantees were 
mostly issued for the transport and manufacturing sectors (figure 9). Within the 
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74 Croatian Highways, Croatian Railways, and port authorities in Rijeka, Split and 
Zadar. In 2009 and 2010, a large part of financial guarantees was issued to firms 
in the manufacturing sector, more specifically to shipbuilders.4 As shipyards were 
restructured and privatised in 2011 the government no longer had to issue guaran-
tees for their loans. However, financial difficulties of highway companies intensi-
fied, so almost all guarantees issued since 2011 have backed up loans to the trans-
portation sector. In sum, government guarantees before 2010 were used almost 
exclusively for propping up the loss-making shipbuilding industry, and since 2011 
the loss-making highway companies. 
Figure 8
The structure of financial guarantees issued by type of creditor from 2009 to first 









2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
Domestic commercial banks Foreign commercial banks EBRD, IBRD, EIB
HBOR Other
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
Figure 9
Structure of the value of financial guarantees issued by sectors from 2009 to the 









2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
Transport Manufacturing
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
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755 fIscal IMPlIcatIons of GoVeRnMent GUaRantees
If guarantees are called on, they become direct government debt. A portion of 
loans for which guarantees are called on has to be repaid by the government. The 
Government and the Ministry of Finance normally attempt to recover part of the 
amount they had to pay for defaulted loans from guarantee reserves. Unfortu-
nately, the amounts recovered and transferred to the budget are low, as the original 
debtors typically have longstanding financial difficulties and are not able to meet 
their obligations. 
The majority of guarantees were called in 2009, 2010 and 2011, primarily in the 
shipbuilding sector (in 2009 by as much as HRK 1.9bn), but also in the transport 
sector, tourism and agriculture. In 2012, the amount of called guarantees de-
creased by 65.4%, primarily due to the fact that the payments for the liabilities of 
shipyards were, as of March 2012, recorded under expenses for the repayment of 
the principal and interest – and not as withdrawals from the guarantee reserves. 
This change was caused by the administrative manoeuvre by which the Govern-
ment in 2011 converted the shipyards’ contingent liabilities – totalling HRK 
11.3bn – into explicit public debt (Bajo and Primorac, 2011a). 
Figure 10








2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
Shipbuilding Transport Manufacturing Agriculture Tourism Local units Other
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
In 2009 and 2010, the total amount of called financial guarantees was far greater 
than returns to the government budget. The original debtors, based on direct de-
posit or otherwise, repaid only 1% of the total amount of guarantees called in those 
years. However, the situation improved in 2011. In addition to direct payments to 
the budget of only HRK 26m, the state also collected claims for paid guarantees by 
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76 Figure 11 







2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 H1
Total called-on financial guarantees Returns related to the called-on guarantees
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
Since 2012, things have drastically changed. Recovery related to guarantees called 
in 2012 was nearly double the total amount of guarantees called in that year. This 
is a direct result of the transformation of claims based on called guarantees issued 
to Croatia Airlines into shares amounting to almost HRK 900m and the acquisi-
tion of the debtor’s real estate worth HRK 3m. In the same way the government 
acquired shares in Croatian Railways Cargo – in the first half of 2015 – amounting 
to HRK 454m. This is de facto hidden financing through increasing the sharehold-
ers’ equity, although the Republic of Croatia is already the only shareholder (hold-
ing 100% of the equity). Therefore, there is not much economic reason behind 
these operations – they are, in effect, state subsidies with a delayed effect and a 
different accounting treatment. 
Table 1



















2009 0.7 2.1 3.8 18  32 56
2010 1.0 1.1 3.2 31  91 34
2011 1.0 1.5 7.7 13  65 20
2012 1.0 0.5 5.1 20 187 10
2013 0.5 0.4 4.3 11 121  9
2014 0.8 0.8 5.6 15 106 14
2015 H1 0.5 0.1 4.5 12 464  3
Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
Between 2009 and 2011 the guarantee reserve funds were not sufficient to cover 
the guarantees called – additional funds had to be provided from alternative 
sources. In the remainder of the observed period, there was an excess of guarantee 
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77secured by government guarantees in 2011. Throughout the period, guarantee re-
serves covered less than 20% of outstanding guarantees (with the exception of 
2010 – 31%). The ratio of called and outstanding guarantees gradually decreased 
from as much as 56% in 2009 to only 3% in the first half of 2015, which is also 
largely a result of the change in the national statistics and record-keeping.
Figure 12
Value and potential maturity of financial guarantees active at the end of the first 






















































Source: Authors based on Ministry of Finance (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a and 2015a).
The beneficiaries of government guarantees have created obligations for the repay-
ment of debts and interest until as far as 2037. The amount and maturities of finan-
cial guarantees vary. In 2015 and 2016 approximately HRK 8bn of loans backed up 
by government guarantees will become due. From 2017 to 2019, and also in 2022, 
the state budget will be under significant pressure from potential “activation” of 
issued financial guarantees and their conversion into direct public debt.
The uncertainty created by government guarantees is a significant source of risks 
from the debt sustainability perspective. If the extent of guarantees called surpasses 
the expected level, it could undermine the sustainability of the debt, increase the 
likelihood of fiscal problems, and ultimately lead to a crisis (IMF, 2005).
Although often misinterpreted in the public, an increase in the value of Croatian 
public debt in the last couple of years cannot be attributed solely to the increase of 
government net-borrowing, but also to a “statistical increase” due to changes in the 
methodological frameworks for debt statistics. These changes mostly relate to the 
increase of the scope of public debt by increasing the scope of the general govern-
ment. The methodological frameworks mostly evolve so as to include institutions 
formally outside the general government in the scope of general government, if it 
is likely that general government will take on their liabilities. The inclusion of lia-
bilities of such institutions in direct public debt decreases the amount of govern-
ment guarantees granted to those institutions to avoid double inclusion of the same 
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78 From 2009 to 2013 the amount of debt to GDP in Croatia increased by 73%. How-
ever, the transition of methodological frameworks – from GFS (Government 
Finance Statistics) to ESA (European System of National and Regional Accounts) 
95 and finally to ESA 2010 – created the public perception of the public debt to 
GDP ratio in 2013 as double the value of 2009 (76% of GDP in 2013 according to 
ESA 2010 related to 36% of GDP in 2009 according to GFS). 
Table 2 
General government debt and government guarantees from 2009 to 2013, according 
to different methodologies (in billion HRK and % of GDP)






















(ESA 2010)(c) 331.0 100 328.0 100 332.6 100 330.5 100 330.1 100
General government debt
GFS 2001(a) 117.7 36 138.0 42 156.0 47 177.3 54 n/a n/a
ESA 95(b) 120.8 36 145.7 44 170.9 51 183.7 56 220.2 67
ESA 2010(c) 158.9 48 186.9 57 211.9 64 228.8 69 266.1 81
ESA 2010-95 38.1 12 41.2 13 41.0 12 45.1 14 45.9 14
Government guarantees
GFS 2001(a) 50.9 15 59.4 18 59.9 18 55.1 17 n/a n/a
ESA 95(b) 51.9 16 56.9 17 51.0 15 54.3 16 53.7 16
ESA 2010(c) 13.1 4 14.9 4 8.4 3 8.6 2 8.0 2
ESA 2010-95 -38.8 -12 -42.0 -13 -42.6 -12 -45.7 -14 -45.7 -14
Sources: (a) MOF (2014), (b) CNB (2014), (c) CNB (2015), and MOF (2015).
Since September 2014, all EU countries are obliged to apply the ESA 2010, which 
is the European version of the UN’s methodological framework System of Na-
tional Accounts (SNA 2008). Due to the new way of expressing certain parts of 
the national economy, the scope of economic sectors changed significantly. In 
addition to changes in the calculation of GDP, the changes are also reflected in the 
scope and size of the deficit and general government debt.
The primary reason for the change in the level of general government debt and 
government guarantees by switching from ESA 95 to ESA 2010 was the reclassi-
fication of the liabilities of Croatian Highways and Rijeka-Zagreb Highway, Cro-
atian Railways Infrastructure, Croatian Radio and Television, together with the 
Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development, State Agency for Deposit 
Insurance and Bank Resolution and the Croatian Energy Market Operator into the 
consolidated central government sector (CBS, 2015). This retroactively increased 
the general government debt, and consequently reduced the amount of guarantees 
throughout the entire period. In 2013, the difference between the amount of guar-
antees according to the old (ESA 95) and the new (ESA 2010) methodology was 
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79according to ESA 95 and 2% of GDP according to ESA 2010. At the same time, 
the general government debt expressed according to these two methodologies dif-
fered by an almost identical amount – reaching 67% of GDP according to ESA 95 
and 81% of GDP according to ESA 2010. The total public debt (general govern-
ment debt plus guarantees) amounted to 83% of GDP in both cases, only the struc-
ture of the debt (direct vs. indirect) being different. This proves that an increase in 
the general government debt in 2013 was – to a large extent – offset by a corre-
sponding decrease in the amount of guarantees, i.e. indirect was transformed into 
direct debt (due to methodological changes) causing a “statistical increase” of the 
public debt. A similar conclusion can be reached for the remainder of the observed 
period (see table 2 and compare the difference ESA 2010-95 for general govern-
ment debt and government guarantees). 
6 conclUsIon
Government guarantees are a significant source of fiscal risk and threaten the sta-
bility of public finance in both developing and developed economies. This points 
to the need for the implementation of a well-developed policy for issuing and 
managing government guarantees. Good practices in contingent liabilities man-
agement include the provision of comprehensive and transparent databases, intro-
duction of certain limitations to exposure to fiscal risks, the establishment of con-
tingencies reserve funds and the existence of separate legislation and institution(s) 
responsible for management of fiscal risks.
The financial crisis has hit EU economies hard and destabilized their financial sec-
tors. In order to maintain the financial stability, the governments have implemented 
various emergency measures often relying on government guarantees. Accord-
ingly, the amount of guarantees in certain countries (e.g. Ireland, Austria, Finland, 
and Slovenia) reached significant amounts. On the other hand, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries have had relatively low levels of guar-
antees. Although Croatia has had a moderate level of guarantees as a percentage 
of GDP compared to other member states, it has to be pointed out that guarantees 
in Croatia proved to be an extremely significant risk source. Namely, the adoption 
of a broader European framework of national statistics (ESA, 2010) has provided 
a more comprehensive picture of government finances by converting indirect lia-
bilities (guarantees) amounting to about 14% of GDP into direct liabilities (gen-
eral government debt). Therefore, the lower-than-average level of guarantees in 
Croatia is not the result of a prudent (restrictive) issuing policy, but rather the fact 
that the majority of issued guarantees qualified for conversion into direct general 
government debt, leaving only a small portion of issued guarantees being recog-
nized as contingent liabilities. 
Two types of guarantees appear in Croatia – financial and performance guaran-
tees. They may be approved by the Government or the Parliament. Croatia has 
mainly issued financial guarantees and mostly in amounts higher than planned. 

















































































40 (1) 63-83 (2016)
80 denominated in euros. The structure of creditors is constantly dominated by do-
mestic commercial banks, whereas the structure of beneficiaries has changed sig-
nificantly throughout the observed period. The share of the transport sector in-
creased because of the restructuring and privatization of shipyards, which caused 
a decrease in the share of guarantees issued to the manufacturing sector. In the 
structure of the called financial guarantees, the most significant liabilities occurred 
between 2009 and 2011 in the shipbuilding sector, whereas from 2012 the amount 
of called guarantees decreased significantly. Refunds related to guarantees called 
from 2009 to 2011 were extremely low, while afterwards they even exceeded the 
amount of the called guarantees. However, this is mainly the result of the conver-
sion of government claims into shares through accounting operations without any 
real cash inflow into the budget.
The policy of issuing government guarantees mainly to public companies with 
major financial problems has led to undesirable consequences for the Croatian 
public debt. Instead of supporting prosperous and healthy economic sectors to 
induce growth and employment, government guarantees in Croatia have actually 
served as a support to loss-making sectors (shipbuilding, transport and the like) 
until their restructuring or privatization. The country should have found appropri-
ate solutions for such sectors through much earlier privatisation or concessioning. 
Adequate management of government guarantees can significantly reduce the as-
sociated fiscal risks. However, the prerequisite for implementing the quality stra-
tegic objectives is the availability of reliable information on the size and structure 
of government guarantees. In Croatia, the existence of comprehensive and trans-
parent databases on the size and structure of government guarantees would help 
formulate strategic objectives. The administrative framework for issuing and 
managing guarantees should also be improved. The legislative framework could 
be enhanced by adopting a single act regulating the area of public debt and fiscal 
risks, whereas gathering all functions related to the management of public debt 
and fiscal risks in one institution (agency) would certainly upgrade the institu-
tional framework, which is currently organized around a few employees of the 
Ministry of Finance. An appropriate administrative infrastructure is a precondi-
tion for the compilation of relevant and reliable fiscal risk reports and the adoption 
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81aPPenDIX
Table a1 
Total stock of government guarantees in EU countries from 2010-2013 (% of GDP)
 2010 2011 2012 2013 average 10/13
Belgium 17.17 14.30 17.08 13.29 15.46
Bulgaria  1.33  1.15  0.98  0.75  1.05
Czech Republic  0.82  0.72  1.10  1.19  0.96
Denmark 14.62 12.77  7.15  9.18 10.93
Germany 21.23 19.66 18.81 18.22 19.48
Estonia  2.64  2.19  1.95  1.71  2.12
Ireland 96.00 83.89 66.89 32.14 69.73
Greece  3.23  3.85  3.86  3.67  3.65
Spain 12.74 14.84 20.68 18.41 16.67
France  6.65  5.57  4.55  5.53  5.58
Croatia  8.97  6.76  7.55  7.25  7.63
Italy  0.81  3.53  6.16  6.10  4.15
Cyprus  7.47  7.81 14.46 15.85 11.40
Latvia  2.88  3.03  2.91  2.31  2.78
Lithuania  1.36  0.99  0.84  0.82  1.00
Luxembourg  5.12  5.03  7.66  7.72  6.38
Hungary  9.48  8.82  8.74  8.03  8.77
Malta 11.80 12.53 16.52 15.88 14.18
Netherlands 10.77  9.95  7.95  7.22  8.97
Austria 53.35 47.13 41.16 35.01 44.16
Poland  5.28  6.28  6.25  6.80  6.15
Portugal  4.63 10.93 12.22 11.97  9.94
Romania  2.36  1.75  2.08  2.15  2.09
Slovenia 19.73 17.89 16.10 17.82 17.89
Slovakia  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.05
Finland 19.62 20.72 21.83 24.08 21.56
Sweden 17.05 14.15 12.13 11.56 13.72


















































































40 (1) 63-83 (2016)
82 RefeRences
1. Bajo, A. and Petrušić, J., 2014. Government guarantees and financial liabilities 
of state owned road transport companies in Croatia. Newsletter, No. 92. doi: 
10.3326/nle.2014.92
2. Bajo, A. and Primorac, M., 2011. Government Guarantees and Public Debt in 
Croatia. Financial Theory and Practice, 35(3), pp. 253-276. doi: 10.3326/
fintp.35.3.1
3. Bajo, A. and Primorac, M., 2011a. Do shipyards pose an obstacle to fiscal 
consolidation in Croatia? Newsletter, No. 64. Available at: <http://www.ijf.hr/
upload/files/file/ENG/newsletter/64.pdf>.
4. Bajo, A. and Primorac, M., 2014. Changes of methodological coverage of public 
debt and budget deficit in Croatia. Press Release, No. 70. doi: 10.3326/pr.2014.70
5. Bajo, A. and Primorac, M., 2015. Should the Maastricht fiscal criteria be rede-
fined? Newsletter, No. 99. doi: 10.3326/nle.2015.99
6. Bajo, A., Primorac, M. and Andabaka Badurina, A., 2011. Osnove upravljanja 
javnim dugom. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance. 
7. CBS, 2015. Excessive Deficit Procedure Report, Republic of Croatia, April 
2015 (ESA 2010). First Release, No. 12.1.2./1. Available at: <http://www.dzs.
hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2015/12-01-02_01_2015.htm>. 
8. Cebotari, A. [et al.], 2009. Fiscal risks: sources, disclosure, and management. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department.
9. CNB, 2014. Bulletin, No. 205. Zagreb: Croatian National Bank. Available at: 
<http://www.hnb.hr/publikac/bilten/arhiv/bilten-205/ebilt205.pdf >.
10. CNB, 2015. Bulletin, No. 217. Zagreb: Croatian National Bank. Available at: 
<http://www.hnb.hr/publikac/bilten/arhiv/bilten-217/ebilt217.pdf >.
11. Eurostat, 2013. European system of accounts: ESA 2010. Available at: <http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5925693/KS-02-13-269-EN.
PDF/44cd9d01-bc64-40e5-bd40-d17df0c69334>. 
12. Eurostat, 2014. Occasional Paper on Recent Eurostat’s Activities Relating to the 
Task Force on Finance Statistics (TFFS). Meeting of the Task Force on Finance 
Statistics World Bank Headquarters, Washington DC, USA. March 13-14, 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.tffs.org/pdf/meet/2014/eurostat0314.pdf>.
13. Eurostat, 2014a. Manual on Government Deficit and Debt: Implementation of 
ESA 2010. Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/ 
5937189/KS-GQ-14-010-EN.PDF/c1466fde-141c-418d-b7f1-eb8d5765aa1d>.
14. Eurostat, 2014b. Eurostat Supplementary Table for the Financial Crisis. 
Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2022675/Back-
ground-note-fin-crisis-Oct-2014-final.pdf>. 
15. Eurostat, 2015. First time release of data on contingent liabilities and non-
performing loans in EU Member States. News release, 26/2015. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6616449/2-10022015-AP-
EN.pdf/d75df6fe-100b-4ae7-a09e-00400edb183a>. 
16. IFAC, 2013. Handbook of international public sector accounting pronounce-
ments. New York: International Federation of Accountants.


















































































40 (1) 63-83 (2016)
8318. IMF, 2014. The Fiscal Transparency Code. Washington: IMF. 
19. Ministry of Finance, 2009. Godišnji izvještaj o izvršenju Državnog proračuna. 
Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/hr/rebalans-proracuna-2009>.
20. Ministry of Finance, 2010. Godišnji izvještaj o izvršenju Državnog proračuna 
za 2010. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/hr/godisnji-izvjestaj-o-izvrsenju-
drzavnog-proracuna>.
21. Ministry of Finance, 2011. Godišnji izvještaj o izvršenju Državnog proračuna 
za 2011. godinu. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/hr/drzavni-proracun-2011- 
godina>.
22. Ministry of Finance, 2012. Izvještaj o danim državnim jamstvima i izdacima 
po državnim jamstvima u 2012. godini. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/hr/
drzavni-proracun-2012-godina>.
23. Ministry of Finance, 2013. Izvještaj o danim državnim jamstvima i izdacima 
po državnim jamstvima u 2013. godini. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/hr/
drzavni-proracun-2013-godina>.
24. Ministry of Finance, 2014. Godišnje izvješće Ministarstva financija za 2012. 
godinu. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/adminmax/docs/Godisnjak%20
2012.pdf>.
25. Ministry of Finance, 2014a. Izvještaj o danim državnim jamstvima i izdacima 
po državnim jamstvima u 2014. godini. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/hr/
drzavni-proracun-2014-godina>.
26. Ministry of Finance, 2015. Godišnje izvješće Ministarstva financija za 2014. 
godinu. Available at: <http://www.mfin.hr/adminmax/docs/Godisnjak%20
2014..pdf>.
27. Ministry of Finance, 2015a. Polugodišnji izvještaj o izvršenju Državnog 
proračuna Republike Hrvatske za prvo polugodište 2015. godine. Draft proposal. 
Available at: <https://vlada.gov.hr/UserDocsImages//Sjednice/2015/252%20
sjednica%20Vlade//252%20-%203..pdf>.
28. Polackova, Brixi, H. and Schick, A., (eds.), 2002. Government at Risk: Con-
tingent Liabilities and Fiscal Risk. World Bank and Oxford University Press.
29. Polackova, Brixi, H., 2004. Contingent Liabilities in New Member States. Fis-
cal surveillance in EMU: New Issues and Challenges. A workshop organized 
by the European Commission Directorate General for Economic affairs, Brus-
sels, November 12, 2004. 
30. Polackova, H., 1999. Contingent Government Liabilities: A Hidden Fiscal 
Risk. Finance and Development, 36(1), pp. 46-49.
31. Ter-Minassian, T. (approved), 2005. Government Guarantees and Fiscal Risk. 
Washington: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department.
32. Thobani, M., 1999. Private Infrastructure, Public Risk. Finance and Develop-
ment, 36(1), pp. 50-53. 
